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Preface to Symposium on
Kentucky Penal Code
By JoHN S. PALMORE*
The Kentucky Penal Code formally originated in a joint resolu-
tion of the 1968 General Assembly directing the Legislative
Research Commission and the Kentucky Crime Commission to
study the statutory criminal law of the state and to make recom-
mendations to the 1970 General Assembly for their substantive
revision, with "suitable penalties for offenses according to modem
theory and practice .. .and ... similar penalties for offenses of
like seriousness."' Though it was not possible for such an under-
taking to be completed by 1970, a final draft of the proposed
Kentucky Penal Code was finished, published in a bound volume,
and widely distributed in November of 1971, after which it was
presented to the 1972 General Assembly as House Bill 197 and,
as extensively amended, was enacted into law. Subject to what-
ever action the 1974 General Assembly may take, it becomes
effective on July 1, 1974.
The drafting of the work was done by a staff and project
director employed by and under the supervision of the Kentucky
Crime Commission and with the assistance and cooperation of
the Legislative Research Commission. As the various chapters
and segments were tentatively completed they were submitted
to a review committee composed of myself as chairman, the
Attorney General, two Circuit Judges, one County Judge, one
Commonwealth's Attorney, one County Attorney, two attorneys
active in the defense of criminal cases, the deans of the University
of Kentucky and University of Louisville law schools, and a
delegate of the Legislative Research Commission. This commit-
tee convened on a monthly basis from September 1969 through
June 1971 with an over-all review session in July (three days)
and a supplementary clean-up session in October 1971.
* Chief Justice, Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
'Ky. Acrs ch. 232 (1968).
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The final draft published in November 1971 and then intro-
duced as House Bill 197 represented a composite of what the
members of the review committee, through discussion and com-
promise but certainly not always unanimously, believed would
be generally acceptable to the public. As such, from a sub-
stantive viewpoint it is a conservative document in that with rare
exceptions it reflects familiar, traditional philosophies and avoids
substantial departure from what the members of the reviewing
committee, based on their broad variety of experience in public
life, considered to be the attitudes of the average man in the
street. It was his ideas, as we conceived them to be, and not
our own, that the review committee tried sincerely to apply as its
criterion of judgment. It was, in fine, guided by the late Edmond
Cahn's felicitous analogy between law and consumer goods, the
public being the consumer for whose satisfaction the law is
spread on the counters.2
Before leaving that subject, let me hasten to confess that the
committee did encounter a few hot potatoes with varying re-
sults. It let a liberalized chapter on abortion get by which was
promptly knocked in the head by the 1972 General Assembly.
After considering a drafted chapter on drugs and other controlled
substances it abandoned the field to the Department of Mental
Health, which prepared and succeeded in having passed separate
legislation more nearly to its liking.3 We compromised here and
there on the subject of capital punishment, leaving it basically
intact, only to see Furman v. Georgia4 blow it into the atmosphere,
whence the pieces have not thus far returned to earth. Mean-
while a study commission, appointed by the Governor pursuant to
a joint resolution5 of the 1972 House and Senate for the cor-
rective purpose of helping the 1974 General Assembly unravel the
knots and kinks left in the Code following the hurried and ex-
tensive amendments made by the 1972 General Assembly, has
that additional problem currently in its lap.
The statutory law had grown haphazardly over the better
part of two centuries. From time to time it had been reviewed
and reorganized and in the Kentucky Revised Statutes had been
2 See E. CAIN, TAE PNmmc=Nmw OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 28 et seq. (1961).
a Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 218A (1972).
4 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5 H.R. 160, Ky. J. OF HOUSE OF REP. 3790 (1972).
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arranged into logical topical divisions. Much improvement had
been accomplished through the continuing efforts of the Legisla-
tive Research Commission. Still, the law bristled with incon-
sistencies and incongruities. Consider, for example, Ky. Rev.
Stat. §§ 435.170, 435.180, and 435.190, and the discussion of these
sections in Williams v. Commonwealth.6 Other anomalies are
ably illustrated in Dean Lawson's comment on the subject of
culpable mental states, appearing in this symposium.
But that was not the worst of it. The worst was that the great
body of substantive criminal law was not in the statutes at all,
as of course it never had been. It resided in the restless ocean of
common law, some of it floating near the surface for everyday
observation, and therefore quite familiar, and some of it virtually
indefinable in the obscurity of the deep.
I have always been intrigued by the ancient fiction that
every man is presumed to know the law. Ordinarily, presump-
tions bear some relation to probabilities, but not that one. The
real reason ignorance of the law is no excuse is that otherwise
there really could not be any law. The need of society for order
and tranquillity demands that everyone be held to the law whether
he understands it or not. Nevertheless, in recent times the United
States Supreme Court has not hesitated to strike down laws both
statutory and nonstatutory, including our own common-law
offense of criminal libel,7 which in its opinion had not attained a
reasonable degree of certainty.
In the field of criminal law it seems to me that these Supreme
Court opinions call for more precise and readily ascertainable
definitions than have prevailed heretofore in our system. Though
we may well doubt that potential offenders are likely to acquaint
themselves with the metes and bounds of the law before they act,
the new order of things is that at least they should be able to.
In its attempt to satisfy that objective the Kentucky Penal Code
is timely if nothing else.
Quite aside, however, from the imaginary potential offender
who may be deterred by a foreknowledge of the law, for the first
time in history the average police officer should be able to find
out what the law is without asking a lawyer. It will all be there
6 464 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1971).
7 Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
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in one place for ready reference. Whatever may be its merits
and shortcomings from the standpoint of substance or draftsman-
ship, that alone makes it worthwhile.
This same circumstance should be of great assistance to mem-
bers of the General Assembly as well, especially those who are
not lawyers. Since the law can be more easily consulted, it can
be more easily understood and amended. That, I think, is good.
As between the body of law that is written in the statutes
and that which must be found in court decisions, by far the
greater portion is in the decisions. But every principle that has
been articulated by the courts across the 800 year history of the
common law represents a failure by the sovereign lawmaking
authority to meet the need for it by enacting it beforehand.
Self-government is best achieved by the direct process of
legislation. No doubt it can never be fully and exclusively so
accomplished, but the more legal goods that are stocked in the
shelves by conscious choice of the consuming public, and the
less by courts and judges who are, at best, assuming the role of
interpreters, the better the system works and the more likely
it is that the consumer will be satisfied.
One final word, as the old-fashioned country lawyers used to
tell the jury, and I am done. This penal code is not like an egg,
which must be left intact and in its pristine state if it is to remain
a functioning egg. To the contrary, it is severable and separately
changeable. It can be amended in pieces, as time reveals flaws.
No one thing in it is indispensable to the rest. As a matter of
fact, not a member of the reviewing committee liked every word
of it, but all of them liked most of it. Though I shy away from
calling it an "experiment" (a term that conjures visions of wild-
eyed tinkerers with explosive substances), government should not
be held to standards of perfection that exclude the wholesome
benefits of trial and error. I close with the words of that great
prayer for the Church, "where it is in error, direct it; where in
any thing it is amiss, reform it. Where it is right, establish it."8
8 THE BooK OF COMmON PRAYm 37.
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